













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ 3 C ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 746
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 747
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C 3 C 3 C 3 [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 749
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 753
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE REMOVAL OF "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 760
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 761
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.











RESISTOR, 5. IK i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.











NASA [ / ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C 3 [ ]
[ 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C 1
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.

















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.


















MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.


















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.


















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.


















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
799
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-IIIO4X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
803
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.


















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.


















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.


















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-IIIO4X.

















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IlI05X-III09X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II105X-III09X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.


















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.


















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.


















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
815
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.

















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIIIOX-IIII4X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIIIOX-IIII4X.


















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.


















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
823
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.


















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IlII0X-IIII4X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.

















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.


















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.


















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.


















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
832
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
836
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIO01X-II079X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
839
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] [P] Cp]
[ ] [ ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:















OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR








[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR










[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] CP]
[ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :















FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR







[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] C P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR











[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
858




[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NEW [ X ]
FRCS
859
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS
861




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL
TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.














OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL
TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] C P ] C P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR










[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR











[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR










[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] [P]
C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
FRCS
873
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











NEW [ X ]
FRCS
875
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











NEW [ X ]
FRCS
877
OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
FRCS
879
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2154 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.











NEW [ X ]
FRCS
881
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED (MULTIPLE
FAILURES) WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :






















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
















[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
OIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] "[ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND 5.
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
i. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
I. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS OF MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /9 ] [ ] [ J [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 988
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 989
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [





















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i000
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i001
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).


















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1016
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1017
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1028
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1029
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2111 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1034
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RLR42 TYPE RESISTORS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO RWR80 TYPE RESISTORS
WHICH CAN SHORT. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
NOTE: OPEN FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR ON THE 05-6KF-2111-I
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING.
TO BE CREATED.
SHORT FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1036
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1037
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1054
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1055
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W




HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.

















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.

















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.

















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
1073
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.

















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1083
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II130X-III34X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.

















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.

















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.


















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.


















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.


















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
ii01
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.

















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.


















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.


















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE

















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE


















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE


















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE


















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1 [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.

















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1119
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-IlI49X.


















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.


















RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS 11145X-III49X.

















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE


















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE












ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH











[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/2R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE


















RJDF2B L5/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE


















RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] C
IOA C 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1128
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE












ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59Xo
SEE












ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE














RJDFIB MANIFOLD F1 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.














RJDFIAMANIFOLD F2 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.














RJDF2AMANIFOLD F3 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.














RJDF2B MANIFOLD F4, F5 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]














CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-2 FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.














CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-I FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
1154
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C p ] [ P ] C p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-2 FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.















OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-I FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] C P ] C P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
112o/88.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY&aI2Y._RWOHEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPAE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















[2/2 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1




HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & B OX FWD HTR PNL 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX FWD HTR PNL 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






(If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
1211




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS









[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/1R] [p]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1221
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1222
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1223
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1224
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.











ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1231
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1232
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1235
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1236
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).











RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
1
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA # : 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] [ ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD i JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.

















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs II160X-III64X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-II164X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET I
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.

















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.

















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.


















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.


















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.

















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-I1174X.

















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CILCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-llI74X.


















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.


















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
1271
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIITOX-III74X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.

















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-II179X.















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.


















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.


















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs llI75X-III79X.
















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.

















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIIS0X-III84X.
















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.


















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIIBOX-III84X.


















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.

















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121345 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. NOTE:
VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON
THIS FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES









[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED.
[ ]
[ ]
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE VERNIER THERMAL SWITCH WAS PART
OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND DID NOT REQUIRE A SEPARATE
FMEA. FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRIMARY THRUSTERS, IOA RECOMMENDS
A FMEA BE CREATED TO COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.











NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11007
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii008
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OFTHE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2156-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER
LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE TO
PERFORM MISSION OPERATIONS
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS
OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER FAILED HIGH
CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR VERNIERS,
THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P J [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES HE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH MANUALLY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257G-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.





















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE,
CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.







FRCS-IIO75X BASELINE [ ]







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C 3
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
C ] C ] *
[P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]2880H[N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD
5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS
THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11083




[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:




ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /iR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11089




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11093




[ P ] C P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11094




[P] C p ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
FRCS-II099X
05-6KF-2030-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11099




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]












(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
r












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)








SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
C ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
C ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :




ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ a/3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ 3
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[P] [P] [Pi
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] ,[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1400


